Environmental Displacement: A New Security Risk for Europe

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Biodiversity offsetting and restoration under the European Union Habitats Directive : balancing between no net loss and deathbed conservation?

Biodiversity offsets have emerged as one of the most prominent policy approaches to align economic development with nature protection across many jurisdictions, including the European Union. Given the increased level of scrutiny that needs to be applied when authorizing economic developments near protected Natura 2000 sites, the incorporation of onsite biodiversity offsets in project design has grown increasingly popular in some member states, such as the Netherlands and Belgium. Under this approach, the negative effects of developments are outbalanced by restoration programs that are functionally linked to the infrastructure projects. However, although taking into consideration that the positive effects of onsite restoration measures leads to more leeway for harmful project development, the EU Court of Justice has recently dismissed the latter approaches for going against the preventative underpinnings of the EU Habitats Directive. Also, the expected beneficial outcomes of the restoration efforts are uncertain and thus cannot be relied upon in an ecological assessment under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. Although biodiversity offsets can still be relied upon whenever application is being made of the derogation clause under Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive, they cannot be used as mitigation under the generic decision-making process for plans and programs liable to adversely affect Natura 2000 sites. We outline the main arguments pro and contra the stance of the EU Court of Justice with regards to the exact delineation between mitigation and compensation. The analysis is also framed in the ongoing debate on the effectiveness of the EU nature directives. Although ostensibly rigid, it is argued that the recent case-law developments are in line with the main principles underpinning biodiversity offsetting. Opening the door for biodiversity offsetting under the Habitats Directive will certainly not reverse the predicament of the EU's biodiversity. A reinforcement of the preventative approach is instrumental to avert a further biodiversity loss within the European Union, even if it will lead to additional permit refusals for unsustainable project developments

Challenges for protected areas management in China

Protected areas are widely recognized as a cornerstone of biodiversity and natural resources management and sustainable development. Protected areas are a vital part of securing human prosperity and quality of life. In China, the legal framework for protected area management is scattered around various regulations. In order to better manage protected areas in China, the Chinese government has issued and revised some laws, regulations and policies on protected areas conservation and management. However, protected areas management is still facing some challenges. There is little legal literature on this issue and this paper tries to fill this gap. Firstly, it will briefly introduce the most relevant laws, regulations and policy on protected areas management. Secondly, it will analyze the recent challenges of protected areas management. Thirdly, some possible suggestions on how to better solve the recent challenges on protected areas management in China will be proposed. These suggestions include improving the management system, improving the relevant legislation, promoting public participation and establishing a diversified funding guarantee system

The Relationship of Ecosystem Services Valuation, Protection and Distribution with the Polluter-Pays Principle and the Provider-Gets Principle

This paper discusses the environmental, economic and social aspects of ecosystem services (ES) and their interactions with the polluter-pays principle and the provider-gets principle. The paper ends with observations concerning the theoretical and practical relationship of those principles with ES and Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) programs. ES have attracted increasing interest through PES as a mechanism which translates external, non-market values of the environment into real financial incentives for local actors to provide ES. The PES approach has inspired new incentives, innovative financing for ecosystem protection. The PES seeks to internalize what would otherwise be an externality. Here, we will observe two principles whose characteristics could relate to those of ES. As a principle which makes the responsible of a polluting activity bearing the cost of pollution, the polluter-pays principle has internalizing, redistributive, preventive and curative functions that combine economic, social and environmental objectives. This makes this principle an available tool for directing sustainable activities. However, sustainable activities could also result in increased environmental quality. In relation to that, the provider-gets principle has been formulated. This principle aims to reward the provider of sustainable activities and needs the description of a desired environmental quality to determinate how much ES are delivered and how they would be compensated. Both principles promote ES protection by means of taxes on pollution or the provision of ES. The provider-gets principle is closer than the polluter- pays principle to ecosystem protection. The polluter-pays principle could be important as an incentive to minimize ecosystem damage through a constraint pollution cost. The polluter-pays principle seeks the right price of an environmental resource through the internalization of the pollution cost of a resource into its price. The interaction of this principle with the ES valuation would depend on the certainty of the internalization of the environmental resource service price into the price of the resource where this service comes from. The counterbalance of ES delivered to rewarded credits inherent to the provider-gets principle confirms its relationship with the ES valuation. There are still uncertainties regarding the rewarded fee as this depends on issues such as consent of parties and the applied law in a PES contract. The social aim of the polluter-pays principle consists of the redistribution of the internalized externality in the community. The internalized pollution costs are, in principle, equally disseminated through public actions for the common interest. The provider-gets principle distributes fees from the ES user to the ES provider and purely environmental benefits to the community depended of ES. We could observe that those two principles could theoretically interact with ES. The provider-gets principle works in practice as PES programs. The polluter-pays principle could complete, PES programs where they are not applied, as an incentive against ecosystem damage and thus , could reduce leakage. Both principles could complementary function with /in PES programs